Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0374-XMaRDI QIDQ2453489zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kfir Eliaz, Roberto Serrano

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62615

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosuregeneralized prisoners' dilemmapartially or fully informative equilibriauninformative equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• A resolution of \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma
• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
• Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
• Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
• A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Interactive implementation
• Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
• Strategic Information Revelation
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

Cited in

(6)

• Interactive information design
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

This page was built for publication: Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453489)