Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0374-XzbMATH Open1296.91053OpenAlexW1588303679MaRDI QIDQ2453489FDOQ2453489

Authors: Kfir Eliaz, Roberto Serrano 

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62615

Recommendations

• A resolution of \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma
• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
• Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
• Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
• A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosuregeneralized prisoners' dilemmapartially or fully informative equilibriauninformative equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
• Interactive implementation

Cited In (6)

• Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Interactive information design

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