Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2453489
DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0374-xzbMath1296.91053OpenAlexW1588303679MaRDI QIDQ2453489
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62615
information disclosuregeneralized prisoners' dilemmapartially or fully informative equilibriauninformative equilibria
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items
Interactive Information Design ⋮ Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists ⋮ Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
Cites Work
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
- Interactive implementation
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
- Strategic Information Revelation
- [https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/wiki/Publication:5441272 Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information]