Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
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Publication:5441272
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.xzbMath1133.91039OpenAlexW3123500292MaRDI QIDQ5441272
Alessandro Pavan, George-Marios Angeletos
Publication date: 11 February 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.x
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44)
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