Public information and uninformed trading: implications for market liquidity and price efficiency

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.012MaRDI QIDQ281383zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bing Han, Ya Tang, Liyan Yang

Publication date 11 May 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.012

zbMATH Keywords

hedgingdiscretionary liquidity tradinginformation aggregationinformation productionmarket liquidity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology
• Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
• Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
• Information Acquisition and Welfare
• Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• The more we know about the fundamental, the less we agree on the price

Cited in

(17)

• Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity *
• How nonlinear benchmark in delegation contract can affect asset price and price informativeness
• The more we know about the fundamental, the less we agree on the price
• Informed Traders as Liquidity Providers: Anonymity, Liquidity and Price Formation
• Searching for ESG information: heterogeneous preferences and information acquisition
• What is the value of knowing uninformed trades?
• Corrigendum to “Trading and Information Diffusion in Over‐the‐Counter Markets”
• Activism, strategic trading, and liquidity
• The Limitations of Stock Market Efficiency: Price Informativeness and CEO Turnover*
• Informational leverage: the problem of noise traders
• Information provision in financial markets
• Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach
• The negative value of private information in illiquid markets
• Coordinated bubbles and crashes
• The negative value of public information in the Glosten-Milgrom model
• Can public information promote market stability?
• Robust pricing under strategic trading

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