Public information and uninformed trading: implications for market liquidity and price efficiency

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.012zbMATH Open1369.91121OpenAlexW2323630568MaRDI QIDQ281383FDOQ281383

Authors: Bing Han, Ya Tang, Liyan Yang 

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.012

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zbMATH Keywords

hedgingdiscretionary liquidity tradinginformation aggregationinformation productionmarket liquidity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology
• Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
• Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
• The more we know about the fundamental, the less we agree on the price
• Information Acquisition and Welfare

Cited In (17)

• Robust pricing under strategic trading
• Corrigendum to “Trading and Information Diffusion in Over‐the‐Counter Markets”
• What is the value of knowing uninformed trades?
• Activism, strategic trading, and liquidity
• Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach
• The negative value of private information in illiquid markets
• Informed Traders as Liquidity Providers: Anonymity, Liquidity and Price Formation
• The more we know about the fundamental, the less we agree on the price
• Can public information promote market stability?
• Coordinated bubbles and crashes
• The negative value of public information in the Glosten-Milgrom model
• Searching for ESG information: heterogeneous preferences and information acquisition
• Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity *
• The Limitations of Stock Market Efficiency: Price Informativeness and CEO Turnover*
• How nonlinear benchmark in delegation contract can affect asset price and price informativeness
• Informational leverage: the problem of noise traders
• Information provision in financial markets

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