Information Acquisition and Welfare

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Publication:4610690

DOI10.1093/restud/rdu015zbMath1405.91353OpenAlexW2069801909MaRDI QIDQ4610690

Luca Colombo, Gianluca Femminis, Alessandro Pavan

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97241




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