Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games

DOI10.1093/res/rdw062zbMath1405.91181OpenAlexW3124636395MaRDI QIDQ4610849

Xavier Vives

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2016/paper_413.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationrational expectationsTobin taxpecuniary externalitybusiness cycle policycursed equilibriumteam solutionlearning externality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Welfare economics (91B15)

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