Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary
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Publication:2211494
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105102zbMath1452.91195OpenAlexW3045708287MaRDI QIDQ2211494
Publication date: 11 November 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105102
Nash equilibriumfinite additivitycompetitive equilibriumexistence of equilibriumcountable additivityidealized limit property
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