Edgeworth-Allocations in an Exchange Economy with Many Traders
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Publication:5331688
DOI10.2307/2525560zbMath0126.36401OpenAlexW4240043449MaRDI QIDQ5331688
Publication date: 1964
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2525560
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