Economies with informational asymmetries and limited vetoer coalitions

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0473-xzbMath1232.91470MaRDI QIDQ5962159

Chiara Donnini, Maria Gabriella Graziano, Achille Basile

Publication date: 21 September 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0473-x

zbMATH Keywords

coalitions; core allocations; asymmetric information economies; veto mechanism; Walrasian expectations allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B44: Economics of information

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Cites Work

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