Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies
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Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3816010 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19670 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Markets with many more agents than commodities Aumann's ``hidden assumption
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Cited in
(19)- The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information
- The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information
- Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
- Economies with informational asymmetries and limited vetoer coalitions
- Information and size of coalitions
- Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information
- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?
- A special class of fuzzy measures: Choquet integral and applications
- Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies
- The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies
- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- The Choquet integral with respect to fuzzy measures and applications
- Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules
- Information equilibrium. Coalition stability
- Blocking coalitions and fairness in asset markets and asymmetric information economies
- A note on the private core and coalitional fairness under asymmetric information
- The Edgeworth's conjecture in finitely additive production economies
- Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
- Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms
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