The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information
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Publication:1704073
DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1057-5zbMATH Open1392.91009OpenAlexW2615898867MaRDI QIDQ1704073FDOQ1704073
Authors: Toshiji Miyakawa 
Publication date: 8 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1057-5
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Cites Work
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- Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
- Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
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