The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1057-5MaRDI QIDQ1704073zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toshiji Miyakawa

Publication date 8 March 2018

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1057-5

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationfarsighted corepolitical game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

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• Incomplete information, credibility and the core
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
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• Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
• Pillage and property
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.
• The farsighted stable set

Cited in

(1)

• A theory of farsightedness in committee games

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