Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
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Publication:2453830
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.02.003zbMath1291.91018MaRDI QIDQ2453830
Publication date: 11 June 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.02.003
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Asymmetric majority pillage games, A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games, Pillage games with multiple stable sets, The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information, Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
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