Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.02.003MaRDI QIDQ2453830zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Colin Rowat, Manfred Kerber

Publication date 11 June 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.02.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Pillage games with multiple stable sets
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games
• Pillage and property
• Power and efficiency in production pillage games

Cites work

• A game with no solution
• A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• Contest success functions
• Efficient sets are small
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3159208 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3775297 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 32081 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 509222 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1064455 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099364 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
• N‐person games in partition function form
• Pillage and property
• Pillage games with multiple stable sets
• Power and efficiency in production pillage games
• Some Recent Developments inn-Person Game Theory
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• Strictly monotonic multidimensional sequences and stable sets in pillage games
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• Using Theorema in the Formalization of Theoretical Economics

Cited in

(9)

• The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• Strictly monotonic multidimensional sequences and stable sets in pillage games
• Asymmetric majority pillage games
• A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games
• Power and efficiency in production pillage games
• Pillage and property
• Pillage games with multiple stable sets

This page was built for publication: Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453830)