Power and efficiency in production pillage games

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0056-5MaRDI QIDQ839610zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James S. Jordan

Publication date 2 September 2009

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0056-5

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gameconflictcoreefficiencylegitimacypillagestable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Pillage and property
• Spatial pillage game
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• Pillage games with multiple stable sets
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games

Cites work

• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099364 (Why is no real title available?)
• Pillage and property
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• Theory of games and economic behavior.

Cited in

(5)

• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• Stability of alliance networks
• Asymmetric majority pillage games
• Pillage and property
• Pillage games with multiple stable sets

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