Power and efficiency in production pillage games

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0056-5zbMATH Open1195.91006OpenAlexW1978772063MaRDI QIDQ839610FDOQ839610

Authors: James S. Jordan 

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0056-5

Recommendations

• Pillage and property
• Spatial pillage game
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• Pillage games with multiple stable sets
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycoreconflictstable setcoalitional gamepillagelegitimacy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Theory of games and economic behavior.
• Pillage and property
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stable sets in majority pillage games

Cited In (5)

• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• Pillage and property
• Pillage games with multiple stable sets
• Stability of alliance networks
• Asymmetric majority pillage games

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