Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0146-7MaRDI QIDQ857978zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincent Anesi

Publication date 5 January 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• A theory of farsightedness in committee games

Cites work

• A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Quota games and stability set of order d
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Stability of voting games
• STABLE SETS FOR SIMPLE GAMES WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(12)

• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
• Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
• A new old solution for weak tournaments
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
• Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• Core-stable committees under restricted domains
• Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution

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