Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:857978
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7zbMath1142.91422OpenAlexW2088936449MaRDI QIDQ857978
Publication date: 5 January 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7
Related Items (8)
Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions ⋮ A new old solution for weak tournaments ⋮ Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria ⋮ Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
- Stability of voting games
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
- Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
- Credible coalitions and the core
- STABLE SETS FOR SIMPLE GAMES WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
- Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
This page was built for publication: Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
