Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets

DOI10.2307/2296927MaRDI QIDQ3944375zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Linda Cohen, Steven A. Matthews

Publication date 1980

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2296927

zbMATH Keywords

majority gamesstrong simple gamestop cycleconstrained Plott equilibriumdirectional coreglobal cycling setsmajority rule intransitivities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Convex programming (90C25) Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited in

(7)

• Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
• Structural instability of the core
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets

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