Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets

DOI10.2307/2296927zbMATH Open0484.90097OpenAlexW2048845614MaRDI QIDQ3944375FDOQ3944375

Authors: Linda Cohen, Steven A. Matthews 

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296927

zbMATH Keywords

majority gamesstrong simple gamestop cycleconstrained Plott equilibriumdirectional coreglobal cycling setsmajority rule intransitivities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Convex programming (90C25) Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (7)

• Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• Structural instability of the core
• Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting

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