Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold

DOI10.1007/BF00433516zbMATH Open0551.90002MaRDI QIDQ800802FDOQ800802

Norman Schofield

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

manifoldcoreclassification of voting rulesinstability dimensionsmooth social choicestructurally stable cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Majority Voting and Social Choice
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
• Minimal Topological Spaces
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria
• Transitivity of preference on a smooth manifold of alternatives
• A further result on the core of voting games
• Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Commodity Exchanges as Gradient Processes
• Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
• Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets
• Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
• Equilibrium under @a-Majority Voting
• Local Simple Games in Public Choice Mechanisms

Cited In (11)

• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Structural instability of the core
• On the core of voting games
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Smooth social choice
• The ``probability of a fit choice
• Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions

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