Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_39zbMath1419.91548OpenAlexW82612935MaRDI QIDQ4644777

Norman Schofield

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_39

zbMATH Keywords

climate changedynamical modelsblack swan eventsheart as social choice correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Extreme sensitivity and climate tipping points

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