Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point

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Publication:3754395

DOI10.2307/1911036zbMath0617.90004OpenAlexW1968723232MaRDI QIDQ3754395

Norman Schofield, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-161716689




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