Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3754395
DOI10.2307/1911036zbMath0617.90004MaRDI QIDQ3754395
Norman Schofield, Richard D. McKelvey
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-161716689
Related Items
Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change, Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView, Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty, Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel, Foundations of spatial preferences, The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters, A theory of voting in large elections, Government formation in a two dimensional policy space, Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists, Existence of a multicameral core, Smooth social choice, Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences, Growth rates in multidimensional spatial voting, Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights, Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections, Necessary gradient restrictions at the core of a voting rule, Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed, Voting over investment, Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model, Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results, On the spatial representation of preference profiles, The instability of instability of centered distributions, The ``probability of a fit choice, The legislative calendar, A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition, Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates, Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models
