Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0507-0zbMATH Open1232.91182OpenAlexW2121196756MaRDI QIDQ537540FDOQ537540

Authors Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg 

Publication date 20 May 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0507-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Gridlock or leadership in U.S. electoral politics
• A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina
• Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Application of a theorem in stochastic models of elections

Cites Work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405563 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization of conditional probability
• A theory of voting in large elections
• Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
• The location of American presidential candidates: An empirical test of a new spatial model of elections

Cited In (7)

• Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
• Application of a theorem in stochastic models of elections
• Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger
• The ``probability of a fit choice
• The convergence coefficient across political systems
• Gridlock or leadership in U.S. electoral politics
• Examining the impact of electoral competition and endogenous lobby formation on equilibrium policy platforms

This page was built for publication: Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q537540)