Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard

DOI10.2307/2171864zbMath0846.90030OpenAlexW2089349505MaRDI QIDQ4883106

Guido Tabellini, Torsten Persson

Publication date: 3 October 1996

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171864

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazard problemrisk sharingprincipal-agent modelsfiscal federalismpolitical equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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