Credible public policy

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-ZzbMath0729.90567MaRDI QIDQ806714

Nancy L. Stokey

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

62P20: Applications of statistics to economics

91B84: Economic time series analysis

91B64: Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation)

91B62: Economic growth models

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

On credible monetary policy and private government information, Expectation traps in a New Keynesian open economy model, Induction and the Ramsey policy, Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information, Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches, Optimal taxes without commitment, Sustainable monetary policies, Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game., A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities, Equilibrium and government commitment

Cites Work

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