Credible public policy

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-ZzbMath0729.90567OpenAlexW2044509448MaRDI QIDQ806714

Nancy L. Stokey

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Economic time series analysis (91B84) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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