A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities

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Publication:2439922


DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.005zbMath1292.91027MaRDI QIDQ2439922

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin L. Reffett, Łukasz Woźny

Publication date: 26 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.005


91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games


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