On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games
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Publication:298295
DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0139-1zbMath1348.91061OpenAlexW1525051514MaRDI QIDQ298295
Şevin Yeltekin, Christopher Sleet
Publication date: 20 June 2016
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0139-1
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Cites Work
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