Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation
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Publication:705844
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.10.001zbMath1117.91009OpenAlexW1608527539MaRDI QIDQ705844
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.10.001
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