Stability and cooperative solution in stochastic games

DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9619-7zbMath1397.91054OpenAlexW218285374MaRDI QIDQ1648919

Alessandro Tampieri, Elena M. Parilina

Publication date: 5 July 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wwwen.uni.lu/research/fdef/crea/publications2/discussion_papers

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumstrategic stabilitysubgame consistencycooperative stochastic gameirrational behaviour proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (5)

Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games ⋮ Sustainable cooperation in dynamic games on event trees with players' asymmetric beliefs ⋮ Stochastic model of network formation with asymmetric players ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ A multiple access game with incomplete information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation
• Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Node-consistent core for games played over event trees
• Sequential stochastic core of a cooperative stochastic programming game
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• TECHNICAL NOTE: "AN IRRATIONAL-BEHAVIOR-PROOF CONDITION IN COOPERATIVE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES"
• Conditions for sustainable cooperation
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Stochastic Games

This page was built for publication: Stability and cooperative solution in stochastic games