Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
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Publication:3274604
DOI10.1090/S0002-9904-1960-10418-1zbMATH Open0096.14706OpenAlexW2026488258MaRDI QIDQ3274604FDOQ3274604
Authors: Robert J. Aumann, Bezalel Peleg
Publication date: 1960
Published in: Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1960-10418-1
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