Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90070-7zbMATH Open0678.90020OpenAlexW2076712208MaRDI QIDQ1124512FDOQ1124512

Authors: Peter J. Hammond, Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Wooders 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90070-7

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zbMATH Keywords

coalitionscontinuum economyWalrasian allocationsAumann coref-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

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• The assignment game. I: The core
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
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• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
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• Indivisible commodities and general equilibrium theory
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
• Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
• On the cores of economies with indivisible commodities and a continuum of traders
• Diversified Consumption Characteristics and Conditionally Dispersed Endowment Distribution: Regularizing Effect and Existence of Equilibria
• Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies

Cited In (31)

• Arbitrage and the flattening effect of large numbers
• Fundamental non-convexity and externalities: a differentiable approach
• Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
• Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
• A three way equivalence
• Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
• Large random graphs in pseudo-metric spaces
• Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
• Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
• Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities
• On \(f\)-core equivalence with general widespread externalities
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
• The nonatomic assignment model
• The hybrid equilibria and core selection in exchange economies with externalities
• The core of the inductive limit of a direct system of economies with a communication structure
• Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
• Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information
• Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
• A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications
• Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
• On the coincidence of cores and consistent distributions in mixed economic systems
• Matching with ownership
• Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
• The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments
• The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies
• On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
• Equilibria in infinite-dimensional production economies with convexified coalitions
• On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
• Walrasian analysis via two-player games
• Non-coalitional Core-Walras equivalence in finitely additive economies with extremely desirable commodities

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