Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders

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Publication:4090166

DOI10.2307/1913073zbMath0325.90082OpenAlexW2035516921MaRDI QIDQ4090166

Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1975

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913073



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