Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders

DOI10.2307/1913073MaRDI QIDQ4090166zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert J. Aumann

Publication date 1975

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1913073

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Trade models (91B60)

Cited in

(48)

• A simple proof of the nonconcavifiability of functions with linear not-all-parallel contour sets
• UNCERTAINTY OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE
• Monetary policy and financial stability
• On dual regularity and value convergence theorems
• A note on the core equivalence theorem
• Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
• The asymptotic Shapley value for a simple market game
• Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
• Values for two-stage games: Another view of the Shapley axioms
• Private value allocations in large economies with differential information
• Strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies
• Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders
• Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets
• Temporal von Neumann-Morgenstern and induced preferences
• Monopoly, syndicate, and Shapley value: About some conjectures
• Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies
• Random marginal and random removal values
• The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game
• Local coordination and market equilibria.
• Concave utility on finite sets
• Cooperative Games
• Wealth and power in a collegial polity
• Payoffs in exact TU economies
• Competitive and value allocations of large exchange economies
• Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
• Risk neutrality regions
• Value allocation with economies of scale
• Values of non-differentiable markets with a continuum of traders
• Remarks on the game-theoretic analysis of a simple distribution of surplus problem
• Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
• Real effects of money in general equilibrium
• Acceptable and Walrasian allocations
• An equivalence principle for perfectly competitive economies
• Voting, bargaining, and factor income distribution
• Large games: Fair and stable outcomes
• Gradients, subgradients, and economic equilibria
• Why do some good bear higher taxes than others?
• Coalition Games and Resource Allocation in Ad-Hoc Networks
• Loeb-measurable solutions to *finite games
• Expectations equilibria with dispersed forecasts
• Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
• Power and public goods
• The values of nonstandard exchange economies
• Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy
• Core and value for a public-goods economy: An example
• Lindahl's solution and values for a public-goods example
• The supermodularity of the tax competition game
• The link between the Shapley value and the beta factor

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