Voting, bargaining, and factor income distribution

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(83)90001-0zbMath0513.90011OpenAlexW2071521072MaRDI QIDQ1050897

Haruo Imai

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(83)90001-0

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueincome distributionbargainingcontinuum of factor ownersHarsanyi coalitional formmeasure-based valuenon-atomic production economyproduction game with voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

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• Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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