A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

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Publication:5728876

DOI10.2307/2525487zbMath0118.15103OpenAlexW4238768247MaRDI QIDQ5728876

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1963

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2525487




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