A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
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Publication:5728876
DOI10.2307/2525487zbMATH Open0118.15103OpenAlexW4238768247MaRDI QIDQ5728876FDOQ5728876
Authors: John C. Harsanyi
Publication date: 1963
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2525487
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Cooperative games with incomplete information
- An NTU value under complement reduced game
- Weighted values and the core in NTU games
- Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
- Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
- Cooperative games with partial information
- An algorithm for finding the vertices of the \(k\)-additive monotone core
- Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002)
- On weighted Kalai--Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games
- The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
- On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations
- The selectope for bicooperative games
- The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
- A Banzhaf value for games with fuzzy communication structure: computing the power of the political groups in the European parliament
- The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems
- The compromise value for NTU-games
- A new proof for Weber's characterization of the random order values
- On the structure of the \(k\)-additive fuzzy measures
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- A procedural egalitarian solution for NTU-games
- Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
- The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games
- Random marginal and random removal values
- The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility
- Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
- Reinterpreting the kernel
- Cooperative games on antimatroids
- The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
- Consistent restricted Shapley values
- Transversality of the Shapley value
- A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure
- A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
- Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
- The Möbius transform on symmetric ordered structures and its application to capacities on finite sets
- On the set of imputations induced by the \(k\)-additive core
- Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
- Characterizations of the random order values by Harsanyi payoff vectors
- A comparison of non-transferable utility values
- A note on solution concepts for nontransferable utility games
- Competitive and value allocations of large exchange economies
- \(k\)-balanced games and capacities
- `Hydraulic' rationing
- An axiomatization of the egalitarian solutions
- On the vertices of the \(k\)-additive core
- Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games.
- A new weight scheme for the Shapley value
- Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
- Coalitional interval games for strategic games in which players cooperate
- Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in \(G\)-hyperplane games
- Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
- On non-transferable utility games with coalition structure
- The vector lattice structure of the \(n\)-person TU games
- A superadditive solution for cephoidal bargaining problems
- A non-cooperative bargaining procedure generalising the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to NTU games
- Learning game theory from John Harsanyi
- Bargaining in cooperative games
- Stability and the Nash solution
- Axiomatic characterizations of generalized values
- Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
- Extreme points of the Harsanyi set and the Weber set
- An axiomatic approach to the measurement of the amount of interaction among criteria or players
- A group bargaining solution
- Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value
- Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions
- Fair welfare maximization
- The construction and characterization of egalitarian solutions for multi-choice NTU games
- Rational cooperation
- An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value
- A cross-efficiency model using bargaining theory in a two-stage network DEA
- A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure
- The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games
- Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems
- Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
- Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
- Union negotiations: complement-associated games
- Cooperation versus competition
- The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths
- A test of the characteristic function and the Harsanyi function in N- person normal form sidepayment games
- Cooperative game as non-additive measure
- Values of games without side payments
- Efficient management of interconnected power systems: A game-theoretic approach
- Fuzzy Harsanyi solutions for fuzzy level structure games with multi weight systems
- How to share when context matters: the Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games
- Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- Proportional marginal effects for global sensitivity analysis
- Inheritance of convexity for partition restricted games
- A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games
- On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments
- The smoothest average: Dirichlet, Fejér and Chebyshev
- A Shapley Value Index for Market Basket Analysis: Efficient Computation Using an Harsanyi Dividend Representation
- The probabilistic games and the Shapley function
- A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
- List of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997
- WEBER POLYHEDRON AND WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES
- Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values
- A competitive test of the descriptive accuracy of the characteristic function, power function, and Shapley value based function
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