Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
For traditional cooperative games in which all coalitions are possible, there exist several natural ways of dividing the total payoff \(v(N)\), e.g., the Shapley value in which \(i\)-th player gets an average of what he brings to all possible coalitions: \(\Phi_i(N,v)=\sum_{S:i\in S\subseteq N} (s-1)!\cdot (n-s)!\cdot [v(S)-v(S-\{i\})]/n!\), where \(s\) is the number of players in \(S\), and \(n\) is the total number of players. In some real-life situations, not all coalitions are possible. The class of all possible coalitions is called a cooperative structure. The author generalizes the known values (including the Shapley value) to games with cooperative structure, shows how known algorithms for computing these values can be generalized to such games, and which properties of the values are preserved under this generalization. The proofs are based on convex geometry, a discrete analogue of convex sets.
- -component additive games
- A note on voting
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164592 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3983158 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- On the convexity of communication games
- On the Position Value for Communication Situations
- Sequencing games
- The theory of convex geometries
- Values of Graph-Restricted Games
- Algebraic structure of games
- A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
- Global games
- The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
- The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
- The Banzhaf power index on convex geometries
- Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions
- Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game
- The selectope for cooperative games
- Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations
- Measuring power in coalitional games with friends, enemies and allies
- Necessary players and values
- The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
- A class of social-Shapley values of cooperative games with graph structure
- The extension of combinatorial solutions for cooperative games
- Cooperative games on simplicial complexes
- Attachment centrality: measure for connectivity in networks
- A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure
- Games, groups, and the global good
- Values for strategic games in which players cooperate
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1599890 (Why is no real title available?)
- Some coalitional games with the Shapley value
- The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
- Shapley, Owen, and the Aumann-Dreze values in a patrolling game with coalition structure
- Introduction of measurement rules on the nodes of oriented structures by using concepts of game theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4162686 (Why is no real title available?)
- Modularity and monotonicity of games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1508412 (Why is no real title available?)
- Pyramidal values
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6139431 (Why is no real title available?)
- A matching value for cooperative games
- Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games
- A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2220923 (Why is no real title available?)
- Emergent collaboration in social purpose games
- The probabilistic Harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games
- A value for cooperative games on simplicial complexes with a filtration
- Cooperative product games
- Values of games over Boolean player sets
- Political power on a line graph
- Shapley, Owen and Aumann-Dreze values in a patrolling game with coalition structure
- Cooperative games with homogeneous groups of participants
This page was built for publication: Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1972566)
