A note on voting

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00003-6zbMath0917.90078MaRDI QIDQ1277468

Paul H. Edelman

Publication date: 18 July 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsvotingHasse diagramShapley-Shubik

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (12)

Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions ⋮ Efficient realizations of closure systems ⋮ Single-peaked compatible preference profiles: Some combinatorial results ⋮ Values and potential of games with cooperation structure ⋮ An alternative model of the formation of political coalitions ⋮ The duality between the anti-exchange closure operators and the path independent choice operators on a finite set ⋮ THE MARGINAL OPERATORS FOR GAMES ON CONVEX GEOMETRIES ⋮ Fundamentals of simple games from a viewpoint of blockability relations ⋮ The Shapley value on convex geometries ⋮ Computational geometry and the U.S. Supreme Court ⋮ The Banzhaf power index on convex geometries ⋮ Voting power in an ideological spectrum. The Markov-Pólya index

Cites Work

• The theory of convex geometries
• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• Global games
• The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
• The Shapley value on convex geometries
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• On the Position Value for Communication Situations
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