Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.007zbMath1400.91022OpenAlexW2283590173MaRDI QIDQ1651251

Ron Peretz, Ziv Hellman

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130537

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuenetwork games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (1)

The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths

Cites Work

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• Computational Complexity of the Game Theory Approach to Cost Allocation for a Tree
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts

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