Allocation rules for network games

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Publication:2486155

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.009zbMath1114.91015OpenAlexW3123902833MaRDI QIDQ2486155

Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79723/




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