Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
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Publication:705948
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.003zbMath1072.91553OpenAlexW1977723709MaRDI QIDQ705948
David Wettstein, David Pérez-Castrillo, Suresh Mutuswami
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.003
Related Items
An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities ⋮ Forming efficient networks ⋮ A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games ⋮ Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities ⋮ Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems ⋮ Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures ⋮ Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs ⋮ Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism ⋮ A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value
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