An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
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Publication:866936
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0156-5zbMATH Open1134.91487OpenAlexW1977917089MaRDI QIDQ866936FDOQ866936
Authors: Nicolás Porteiro 
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5
Recommendations
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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Cited In (4)
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