An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5zbMath1134.91487OpenAlexW1977917089MaRDI QIDQ866936

Nicolás Porteiro

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities ⋮ Smooth multibidding mechanisms

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