An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
- Auctioning the provision of an indivisible public good
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Bargaining and Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems
- Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining
- Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
- Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
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