An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0156-5MaRDI QIDQ866936zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicolás Porteiro

Publication date 14 February 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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• Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
• Auctioning the provision of an indivisible public good
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Bargaining and Value
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems
• Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining
• Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good

Cited in

(4)

• Efficient bidding with externalities
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• Equilibrium and disequilibrium in negotiation of public joint ventures
• Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities

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