Efficient bidding with externalities
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Publication:863282
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.002zbMATH Open1153.91324OpenAlexW2112642410MaRDI QIDQ863282FDOQ863282
Authors: Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein 
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.002
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Cites Work
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- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
- An implementation of the Owen value.
- Values of games in partition function form
- The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
- Bargaining with commitments
- A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
- On implementation via demand commitment games
Cited In (22)
- Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
- Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities
- Symmetrical Core and Shapley Value of an Information Transferal Game
- Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
- The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- Bidding rings: a bargaining approach
- A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
- Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation
- Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
- Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions
- Shapley value in a model of information transferal
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- Smooth multibidding mechanisms
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
- Bidding games and efficient allocations
- A mixed integer model of bidding strategies for outsourcing
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
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