Efficient bidding with externalities

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.002MaRDI QIDQ863282zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Publication date 26 January 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueimplementationexternalitiesbidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• An implementation of the Owen value.
• Bargaining with commitments
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• On implementation via demand commitment games
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• Values of games in partition function form

Cited in

(23)

• Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation
• An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
• Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
• Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• Bidding games and efficient allocations
• A mixed integer model of bidding strategies for outsourcing
• A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• Bidding rings: a bargaining approach
• The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
• Shapley value in a model of information transferal
• Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities
• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
• Symmetrical core and Shapley value of an information transferal game
• Coalition formation in games with externalities
• Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities
• Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
• Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions
• Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value

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