Symmetrical core and Shapley value of an information transferal game
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Publication:4606779
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_14zbMATH Open1407.91024OpenAlexW2507101028MaRDI QIDQ4606779FDOQ4606779
Authors: Patricia Lucia Galdeano, Luis G. Quintas
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Trends in Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_14
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