Symmetrical core and Shapley value of an information transferal game
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(5)- Private information, transferable utility, and the core
- The core and nucleolus in a model of information transferal
- A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel
- Shapley value in a model of information transferal
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4185431 (Why is no real title available?)
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