Symmetrical Core and Shapley Value of an Information Transferal Game

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_14zbMath1407.91024OpenAlexW2507101028MaRDI QIDQ4606779

Patricia Lucia Galdeano, Luis G. Quintas

Publication date: 9 March 2018

Published in: Trends in Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_14

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecooperative game theoryinformation transferalsymmetrical core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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