A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel

DOI10.1007/BF01541032zbMath0764.90098OpenAlexW2129258539MaRDI QIDQ4000925

Mikio Nakayama, Shigeo Muto, Theo S. H. Driessen

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: ZOR Zeitschrift für Operations Research Methods and Models of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01541032

zbMATH Keywords

kernelnucleolustechnological innovationsymmetrical strong \(\varepsilon\)-corestrade of the information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

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Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ 1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value ⋮ Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market ⋮ A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players ⋮ Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information ⋮ The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees ⋮ Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes

Cites Work

• Coalition production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs. Asymptotic results
• Optimal license fees for a new product
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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