Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.12.001zbMATH Open1208.91055OpenAlexW2015319631MaRDI QIDQ633347FDOQ633347
Authors: Shin Kishimoto, Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto 
Publication date: 31 March 2011
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2241/113171
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Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
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- Cooperative games with coalition structures
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- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
- Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
- A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel
- Licensing of a quality-improving innovation
- Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result
- Coalition production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs. Asymptotic results
- Large games: Fair and stable outcomes
- Optimal license fees for a new product
- Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information
- Resale-proofness and coalition-proof Nash equilibria
Cited In (20)
- Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models
- Bargaining with private information and the option of a compulsory license
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
- Calmness of a perturbed Cournot Oligopoly Game with nonsmooth cost functions
- Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
- Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
- The bargaining model of technology licensing
- Bargaining with a property rights owner
- FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
- The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
- An analysis of technology licensing and parallel importation under different market structures
- Licensing agreements as bargaining outcomes: general results and two examples
- Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments
- Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
- Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
- The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
- Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
- The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
- On the core of a patent licensing game
- The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees
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