FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2010.00356.XzbMATH Open1254.91230OpenAlexW2111434169MaRDI QIDQ4899994FDOQ4899994
Authors: Shin Kishimoto, Shigeo Muto 
Publication date: 10 January 2013
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.x
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- The bargaining problem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
- Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
Cited In (9)
- Technology licensing strategies for three cost-differential manufacturers
- Dynamic product positioning in differentiated product markets: the effect of fees for musical performance rights on the commercial radio industry
- The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
- Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly
- Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments
- DECISION MAKING ON STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: FIXED-FEE VERSUS ROYALTY LICENSING METHODS
- Bargaining over a license: A counterintuitive result
- On the core of a patent licensing game
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
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