FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2010.00356.XMaRDI QIDQ4899994zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shin Kishimoto, Shigeo Muto

Publication date 10 January 2013

Published in Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutionfee licensingroyalty licensingCournot duopoly market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
• On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
• Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments
• Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
• Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly
• The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
• The bargaining model of technology licensing
• Bargaining over a license: A counterintuitive result

Cites work

• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
• The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
• The bargaining problem

Cited in

(12)

• Technology licensing strategies for three cost-differential manufacturers
• Dynamic product positioning in differentiated product markets: the effect of fees for musical performance rights on the commercial radio industry
• The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
• Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments
• Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly
• Licensing under general demand and cost functions
• When does a royalty clause with a guarantee lead to a no-equilibrium situation in a licensing contract?
• DECISION MAKING ON STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: FIXED-FEE VERSUS ROYALTY LICENSING METHODS
• Bargaining over a license: A counterintuitive result
• On the core of a patent licensing game
• The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees
• Fee versus royalty reconsidered

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