FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

DOI10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.xzbMath1254.91230MaRDI QIDQ4899994

Shigeo Muto, Shin Kishimoto

Publication date: 10 January 2013

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solution; fee licensing; royalty licensing; Cournot duopoly market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

Bargaining over a license: A counterintuitive result, On the core of a patent licensing game, Technology licensing strategies for three cost-differential manufacturers, Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments, The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology

Cites Work

• The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
• Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• The Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model