Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model

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Publication:1274189

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00092-5zbMath0914.90033OpenAlexW2139905237MaRDI QIDQ1274189

X. Henry Wang

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00092-5




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