Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_23MaRDI QIDQ5261495zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Flávio Ferreira, Oana Ruxandra Tuns (Bode)

Publication date 3 July 2015

Published in Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear Physical Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_23

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationlicensingindustrial organizationdifferentiated Stackelberg modeldifferentiated Cournot model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: general results
• Patent licensing with spillovers
• Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
• Licensing by fixed-fee and two-part tariff in a differentiated Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
• Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Licensing schemes in Stackelberg model under asymmetric information of product costs
• The bargaining model of technology licensing
• Privatization in the presence of patent licensing

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099358 (Why is no real title available?)
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
• Licensing in an International Competition with Differentiated Goods
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation

Cited in

(6)

• Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development
• Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
• Who Profits from Patents? Rent-Sharing at Innovative Firms*
• Licensing by fixed-fee and two-part tariff in a differentiated Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
• Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
• Licensing schemes in Stackelberg model under asymmetric information of product costs

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