Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_23zbMATH Open1315.91043OpenAlexW377669739MaRDI QIDQ5261495FDOQ5261495
Authors: Flávio Ferreira, Oana Ruxandra Tuns (Bode) 
Publication date: 3 July 2015
Published in: Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear Physical Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_23
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optimizationlicensingindustrial organizationdifferentiated Stackelberg modeldifferentiated Cournot model
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
- Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
- Licensing in an International Competition with Differentiated Goods
Cited In (5)
- Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development
- Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
- Who Profits from Patents? Rent-Sharing at Innovative Firms*
- Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
- Licensing schemes in Stackelberg model under asymmetric information of product costs
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