On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:1676748)
Recommendations
Cited in
(28)- Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Technology cooperation between firms of developed and less-developed countries
- Privatization in the presence of patent licensing
- Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?
- Profit-sharing licensing
- Technology licensing under product differentiation
- Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
- Information disclosure through technology licensing
- Technology transfer: barriers and opportunities
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
- On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations
- Licensing under general demand and cost functions
- Pricing model and trade terms of technology transfer
- Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 509229 (Why is no real title available?)
- Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models
- Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look
- Technology transfer with commitment.
- Technology licensing and collusion
- Impact of technology development costs on licensing form in a differentiated Cournot duopoly
- More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies
- Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs
- Spillovers, licensing and welfare
- Trade and technology transfer in a vertically differentiated industry
- Technology licensing under optimal tax policy
- Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing
This page was built for publication: On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1676748)