More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies
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Publication:6100985
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Cites work
- Cross ownership and divestment incentives
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
- Technology licensing under product differentiation
- Technology licensing, R\&D and welfare
Cited in
(7)- Welfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputs
- Licensing in an International Market
- Welfare effects of entry into international markets with licensing
- International licensing under an endogenous tariff in vertically-related markets
- An analysis of technology licensing and parallel importation under different market structures
- Licensing of a new technology by an outside and uninformed licensor
- Environmental policy, licensing strategy, and social welfare
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