More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies
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Publication:6100985
DOI10.1007/S00712-023-00818-XzbMATH Open1518.91105MaRDI QIDQ6100985FDOQ6100985
Authors: Ku-Chu Tsao, Jin-Li Hu, Hong Hwang, Yan-Shu Lin 
Publication date: 20 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Welfare economics (91B15)
Cites Work
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Technology licensing, R\&D and welfare
- Technology licensing under product differentiation
- Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
- Cross ownership and divestment incentives
Cited In (6)
- Licensing in an International Market
- Licensing of a new technology by an outside and uninformed licensor
- International licensing under an endogenous tariff in vertically-related markets
- Welfare effects of entry into international markets with licensing
- An analysis of technology licensing and parallel importation under different market structures
- Environmental policy, licensing strategy, and social welfare
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