Welfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputs

DOI10.1007/S00712-022-00782-YzbMath1500.91066OpenAlexW4220860606MaRDI QIDQ2081093

Yan-Shu Lin, Pei-Cyuan Shih, Yen-Ju Lin

Publication date: 12 October 2022

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00782-y

zbMATH Keywords

two-part tariffssocial welfarecomplementary inputsinput pricingvertical licensingvertically-related market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

International licensing under an endogenous tariff in vertically-related markets

Cites Work

• Technology licensing, R\&D and welfare
• Vertical integration without intrafirm trade
• Outsourcing suppliers as downstream competitors: biting the hand that feeds
• Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?
• Complementary monopolies and multi-product firms
• Welfare reducing licensing.
• The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
• Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
• On the Effects of Downstream Entry
• The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier

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