The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology

DOI10.1007/s00712-019-00672-wzbMath1436.91071OpenAlexW2965050214MaRDI QIDQ1985890

Shin Kishimoto

Publication date: 7 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-019-00672-w

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powerlicensingsocial welfareasymmetric Nash bargaining solutioncost-reducing technology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (2)

Technology licensing under product differentiation ⋮ Welfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputs

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?
• Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
• Profit-sharing licensing
• Per unit vs. ad valorem royalty licensing
• Welfare reducing licensing.
• A comment on ``welfare reducing licensing
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• The Bargaining Problem
• Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
• FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

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