General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.005zbMath1271.91065MaRDI QIDQ2371156

Debapriya Sen, Yair Tauman

Publication date: 29 June 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

cost-reducing innovation; AR policy; outside innovator; incumbent innovator

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate, Demand structure and the incentive to innovate, Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market, Foreign investigations in the field of game-theoretic analysis of innovations, On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets, The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results, License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers, Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing, Royalty licensing, Bargaining with a property rights owner, Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes, The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach, Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies, Fee versus royalty reconsidered

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