License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
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Publication:926884
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.010zbMath1134.91386OpenAlexW3124342104MaRDI QIDQ926884
Thomas Giebe, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1151/
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Cites Work
- On the value of information in a strategic conflict
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- Unnamed Item
