Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates
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Publication:2437828
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.003zbMath1282.91066MaRDI QIDQ2437828
Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Cuihong Fan
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.003
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
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Per unit vs. ad valorem royalty licensing, Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire, Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
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- A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium