Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099358 (Why is no real title available?)
- License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
- Log-concave probability and its applications
Cited in
(5)- Per unit vs. ad valorem royalty licensing
- Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
- Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
- Licensing radical product innovations to speed up the diffusion
- License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
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