Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1810690
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00031-0zbMATH Open1032.91057WikidataQ59938143 ScholiaQ59938143MaRDI QIDQ1810690FDOQ1810690
Authors: Jacob K. Goeree 
Publication date: 9 June 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- Logconcavity versus logconvexity: A complete characterization
- Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining
- Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
- An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
- A signaling theory of congressional oversight
Cited In (28)
- License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Reputational bidding
- Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
- Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note
- Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
- Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights
- Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
- Corrigendum to ``Reserve price signaling
- Reserve price signaling
- Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction
- Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
- Costly Signalling in Auctions
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Signal jamming in a sequential auction
- Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition
- Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength
- Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence
- Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
- A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
- Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
This page was built for publication: Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1810690)
