Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
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Publication:1810690
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Cites work
- A signaling theory of congressional oversight
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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- An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099358 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
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- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
Cited in
(29)- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
- Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence
- Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition
- Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction
- Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
- Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights
- Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates
- Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
- Reputational bidding
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
- Costly Signalling in Auctions
- Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note
- Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
- Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
- Corrigendum to ``Reserve price signaling
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Auctions with signaling bidders: optimal design and information disclosure
- A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
- License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
- Signal jamming in a sequential auction
- Reserve price signaling
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